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How Should Inheritance Law 
Remediate Inequality? 
 
FELIX B. CHANG* 
This Essay argues that trusts and estates (“T&E”) should 
prioritize intergenerational economic mobility—the ability of 
children to move beyond the economic station of their parents—
above all other goals. The field’s traditional emphasis on 
testamentary freedom fosters the stickiness of inequality. For 
wealthy settlors, dynasty trusts sequester assets from the nation’s 
system of taxation and stream of commerce. For low-income 
decedents, intestacy splinters property rights and inhibits their 
transfer, especially to nontraditional heirs. 
Holistically, this Essay argues that T&E should promote mean 
regression of the wealth distribution curve over time. This can be 
accomplished by loosening spending in ultrawealthy households 
and spurring savings and investment in low-income households. 
T&E scholars are tackling inequality with greater urgency 
than ever before; yet basic questions remain. The Essay 
contributes to these conversations by articulating a 
comprehensive framework for progressive inheritance law that 
redresses long-term inequality.  
 
 * Professor and Co-Director, Corporate Law Center, University of 
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School of Management. E-mail: felix.chang@uc.edu. I am grateful to Bridget 
Crawford and Claire Priest for their insightful comments. Thanks, too, to 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Every generation gets the trusts and estates (“T&E”) 
scholarship it deserves.1 In our era of rampant inequality, the 
traditional conception of T&E—as a field animated by 
testamentary freedom—now seems outdated.2 Today, T&E 
scholars are confronting the doctrines and default rules most 
responsible for accelerating inequality.3 But fundamental 
questions remain. What do scholars mean by “inequality,” and 
how can inheritance law advance holistic solutions? 
Existing proposals have overlooked how T&E’s components 
fit together—as well as how they complement, or work against, 
business law and economic cycles.4 A bimodal distribution has 
come to define the instruments of T&E. On one hand, trusts and 
nonprobate instruments cater to the privacy desires and dynastic 
aspirations of the hyperwealthy.5 On the other, intestacy and the 
probate system serve low-income households terribly, throwing 
intrafamilial conflicts into public view.6 It is a schism that 
reinforces the distribution of incomes and family compositions 
across society. 
 
1 See JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, LETTRES ET OPUSCULES INEDITS (1851) (“Every nation 
has the government it deserves.”); ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
(1964) (“Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true 
is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on.”). 
2 Testamentary freedom is the freedom of a testator to dispose of their estate as 
they please. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1975). 
3 See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda 
for Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 340 (2014); Palma 
Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. 
L. REV. 453, 457 (2010); Carla Spivack, Broken Links: A Critque of Formal Equality 
in Inheritance Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 191. 
4 But see Eric Kades, Of Piketty and Perpetuities: Dynastic Wealth in the Twenty-
First Century (And Beyond), 60 B.C. L. REV. 145, 177–78 (2019); Allison Anna Tait, 
The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 ALA. L. REV. 981 (2020). 
5 See infra Section IV.A. 
6 See infra Section IV.B. 
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This Essay shows how T&E can thwart wealth inequality—
and at macroeconomic scale. Many of its rules are inputs into the 
tax system, a comprehensive redress for inequality. For example, 
fortifying the Rule against Perpetuities (“RAP”) frees up large 
estates for taxation and, more importantly, incentivizes settlors to 
divert assets to spending.7 At the other end of the wealth 
spectrum, where most decedents pass without having written 
wills,8 intestacy reform could preserve assets for productive use 
by heirs, thereby supplementing government programs, tax 
refunds, and intermittent stimuluses.9 
Yet reforming T&E’s rules and doctrines can produce 
distortions that complicate any remediation of inequality. 
Tightening the tax loopholes around dynasty trusts might prove 
counterproductive if, for instance, settlors chose to invest rather 
than spend down money that would otherwise fund trusts.10 
When elites seek investment opportunities in a stagnant economy, 
like the one we find ourselves in today, their wealth compounds 
much more quickly than the incomes of average wage-workers. 
Inequality accelerates in the short term.  
We must therefore be mindful of how inheritance laws and 
the macroeconomy fit together. Where there is incongruence (e.g., 
between reducing inequality and cushioning recessions) or 
indeterminacy (e.g., when we trade one type of inequality for 
another), this Essay argues that T&E should prioritize the long-
 
7 The RAP determines when estate taxes accrue to a trust; if a state has 
abolished the RAP or set the vesting period at 1,000 years, grantors can settle 
trusts under those rules to escape estate taxes altogether. See Jesse Dukeminier 
& James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1304 
(2003). See also 26 U.S.C. § 2631.  
8 See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of 
Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877 (2012). 
9 On the tortuous path of debates over pandemic stimulus in the last month 
alone, see Luke Broadwater and Jim Tankersley, Biden’s Economic Plan Is Set to 
Clear a Senate Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2021; Luke Broadwater & Jim 
Tankersley, Republicans Pitch Biden on Smaller Aid Plan as Democrats Prepare to 
Act Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2021. 
10 See infra Section IV.A. 
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term goal of fostering intergenerational economic mobility 
(“IEM”)—the ability of children to move beyond the economic 
station of their parents.11 
By reorienting inheritance law around IEM, this Essay 
provides a theoretical framework for addressing inequality. Its 
singular contribution is to unify the disparate calls for reform 
within T&E. Concerned about runaway inequality, scholars are 
prescribing a variety of changes to T&E’s rules and standards, 
riddling its defaults with exceptions.12 Left unabated, this trend 
will leave the regime “more holes than cheese.” An overhaul of 
T&E is therefore needed—and it should start with the field’s first 
principles. 
The attention to IEM allows this Essay to take a 
macroeconomic perspective that brings T&E into sharper relief, 
highlighting the field’s capacity to accomplish two goals—
loosening spending in ultrawealthy households and spurring 
savings and investment in low-income households. More broadly, 
estate planning is both an input and an output of the 
macroeconomy. Demarcations are blurry among tax law (which 
effectuates redistribution), business law (which governs the 
generation of wealth), and T&E (which governs the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth). Yet inheritance law is a 
critical interface where the ill-gotten gains incentivized by lax 
business laws can be clawed back and redirected into the tax 
system in a progressive manner, targeting large estates for 
taxation while leaving small estates intact. Assembling these 
 
11 In economics, IEM can be defined and measured in different ways. On option 
is to gauge the elasticity of incomes between fathers and sons, so as to avoid 
the variability of women’s income in the labor force due to the gendered wage 
gap. See Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and 
Intergenerational Mobility, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 79 (2013). 
12 See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, What Happened to Grandma’s House: The Real 
Property Implications of Dying Intestate, 53 DAVIS L. REV. 2603 (2020) (tax sales 
and foreclosures of decedent property); Heather K. Way, Informal 
Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113 
(2009) (providing clear title to properties inherited by low-income households). 
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threads into a comprehensive framework, this Essay provides a 
blueprint for what progressive inheritance law might look like. 
Secondarily, this Essay enriches the law and macroeconomics 
literature by illustrating how T&E can check inequality. “Law and 
macro” is quickly emerging as an alternative to the efficiency-
obsessed, microeconomics-focused bent of law and economics.13 
Yet inequality presents unique challenges. The compounding of 
wealth inequality does not swing like, or follow the pace of, 
economic cycles—it is a slower burn, though intensifying in recent 
years. Since 1986, when updates to the Generation Skipping 
Transfer tax spurred the creation of dynasty trusts, the U.S. has 
undergone at least four cycles of recession and recovery, 
including the financial crisis. During this time, inequality has not 
wavered. Some of the antidotes to inequality emanating from T&E 
will take generations to bear fruit. And as a stimulus measure, 
constraining dynasty trusts might, perversely, incentivize settlors 
invest, which further concentrates corporate wealth.14 We must 
therefore be mindful of how laws governing the transmission of 
wealth (i.e., T&E) and the economy fit together. 
The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows: Section II 
makes the case for IEM as T&E’s animating principle, abandoning 
the misplaced deference to testamentary freedom. Section III 
argues that a focus on IEM can reduce long-term inequality, 
arresting its velocity of inequality by forcing the tail ends of the 
wealth distribution spectrum—ultrawealthy and low-income 
households—to regress toward the mean. With these guideposts, 
Section IV outlines what a progressive brand of T&E might look 
like, assessing reforms to dynasty trusts and intestacy. Section V 
concludes. 
 
13 See Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions, 
34 YALE J. ON REG. 791 (2017); Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long?, 
83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLS. 141 (2020). Professor Listokin now organizes an 
annual Law and Macro conference. For the latest program, see Program, THE 
3RD CONFERENCE ON LAW AND MACROECONOMICS (2020), 
https://lawandmacro.org/#program. 
14 See infra Section II. 
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II.  REORIENTING THE GOALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
 
T&E was long thought to be the province of testamentary 
freedom, or the notion that a testator can dispose of their assets 
however they please.15 Until recently, neither inequality nor 
redistribution played any role in the field. This is understandable. 
After all, T&E governs discrete relationships among heirs and 
between principals and agents, replete with legal rules balancing 
the interests among tightly drawn circles of constituents.16 Even 
the handful of T&E scholars embracing economic analysis have 
avoided the subject of redistribution.17  
This Section makes the case for reorienting T&E’s organizing 
principle from testamentary freedom to intergenerational 
economic mobility. It begins by tracing the field’s evolution from 
testamentary freedom to inequality. Then it examines the 




15 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
10.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (freedom of testation the “organizing principle 
of the American law of succession”). 
16 E.g., intestacy, rules of construction, execution formalities, and curative 
doctrines (apportioning estates among heirs) and fiduciary duties 
(apportioning the balance of power between beneficiaries and fiduciaries such 
as executors and trustees). For a full taxonomy, see Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries 
in the Generation and Transmission of Wealth, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2018). 
17 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead 
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6–8 (1992); Daniel B. Kelly, Trust Term Extension: An 
Economic Analysis, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 85, 87–88 (2015); Lee-Ford Tritt, The 
Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2579, 2589 (2011). But see Chang, supra note 16. Law and economics scholars in 
particular downplay the redistributive potential of rules. See Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules 
and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 822–23 (2000).  
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A.  From Freedom to Equality 
 
Every generation gets the T&E scholarship it deserves. In 
1975, John Langbein wrote that “virtually the entire law of wills 
derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of 
his property as he pleases in death as in life.”18 Professor Langbein 
made this sweeping declaration to marshal outrage against the 
rigid formalism of wills execution, which require wills to be 
written and signed by testators and attested by witnesses.19 As he 
and others saw it, these formalities emanated from the arcane 
Wills Act of 1677, which could be unresponsive to testamentary 
desires.20 These reformers therefore pushed for probate courts to 
suspend execution requirements if doing so would honor 
testamentary intent. 
At the time, the estate tax exemption was $60,000, and the top 
estate tax rate was 77% (applying to a top bracket of $10 million 
and beyond).21 Advocates of estate tax repeal (hereafter, the 
“Repealers”) were mostly an unsympathetic band of superrich 
families, who notched the occasional rate reduction or legislative 
preference.22 Although Professor Langbein had invoked 
testamentary freedom in his fight to add the dispensing power 
into the Uniform Probate Code, he would become indelibly 
associated with the contractarian turn in T&E’s fiduciary 
standards, which loosened the duties binding trustees and 
investment advisors.23 This turn reflected the ethos of the time—
 
18 Langbein, supra note 2. Langbein did note estate taxes as an exception, and 
he was writing in the broader context of execution formalities. 
19 Langbein, supra note 2, at 490. 
20 See id.; Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1994). 
21 Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax:  Ninety Years and Counting,  
22 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE 
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 18 (2005) (Gallo wine family in 
California successfully lobbying Senators Cranston and Dole in 1978 to get 10 
years to pay off estate taxes). 
23 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 
YALE L.J. 625 (1995). 
DRAFT 4/2/2021  11:03 AM 
2021]  INHERITANCE AND INEQUALITY 7 
 
the libertarian creep of law and economics into antitrust, 
contracts, corporate law, torts, and eventually T&E. The enduring 
legacy of Professor Langbein’s body of work, then, is the 
sentiment that testators should be able to dispose of their assets as 
they please. 
A generation later in 1990, when the estate tax exemption had 
grown over 10-fold to $675,000 and the top estate tax rate had 
dwindled to 55% (applying to a top bracket of $3 million),24 Mark 
Ascher argued that a decedent’s property should escheat entirely 
to the state upon their death.25 His thesis was driven by the norm 
of fairness: excessively liberal inheritance laws permit a testator’s 
cold “dead hand” to steer their assets and dictate the trajectory of 
their descendants long after the testator had died.26 For 
extraordinarily wealthy families, this meant that  a child’s station 
in life would be determined far more by the luck of the family they 
were born into than their own diligence, which seemed to vitiate 
the ideal of equality.27 Dead hand control also limits the 
productive use of property by the living if, for instance, a trust 
only gave life estate holders income streams but forbade assets 
 
24 See Jacobson et al., supra note 21. 
25 Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 73 (1990). 
26 Id. at 150 (“By tolerating almost unrestricted dead hand control over 
property, this nation has always allowed the children of the wealthy all the 
financial advantages inheritance has had to offer.”). 
27 See id. at 1169 (“Failing to tax transfers of wealth at death . . . promotes and 
nurtures an aristocratic class—individuals with enormous amounts of wealth 
and power achieved not because of their talents or effort but solely because of 
the luck of their birth”) (quoting RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: 
THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD (2010)). This argument has not been 
restricted to law or a specific time period. The writer Zadie Smith, for instance, 
has said that “[there is the] gift of being born in a certain condition—with a 
certain amount of money, in a certain state, with a certain skin color and a 
certain gender. And what rights accrue to you because of that? And what duties 
accrue to you because of that?” Zadie Smith, Novelist Zadie Smith on Historical 
Nostalgia and The Nature of Talent, FRESH AIR, Nov. 21, 2016 (transcript available 
at https://www.npr.org/2016/11/21/502857118/novelist-zadie-smith-on-
historical-nostalgia-and-the-nature-of-talent). 
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from being sold or pledged.28 Finally, at a time when the U.S. was 
fixated on the federal deficit,29 it was unconscionable to let 
gargantuan estates bypass a tax that could bring government 
coffers some relief.30 
Shortly after Professor Ascher’s seminal article, the Repealers 
gained momentum. Republicans took the House in 1994 after 
decades out of power; led by Newt Gingrich, the insurgent wave 
was different than the previous breed of lawmakers, who had 
sought compromise over trench warfare.31 These “Young Turks” 
allied themselves with the die-hard Repealer Grover Norquist 
and then enlisted family farms and small businesses to lay siege 
to the estate tax. This coalition achieved its first legislative victory 
in the Qualified Family Owned Business Interests provisions of 
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.32 Because this law proved had 
been watered down by legislative bargaining, it hardened the 
Repealers’ resolve for outright elimination of the estate tax.33 
In the academy, T&E scholars were using empirical 
methodologies to show that testamentary freedom was not only 
elusive but also deleterious. Melanie Leslie surveyed hundreds of 
probate cases to reveal that judges enforce and disregard 
formalities freely to arrive at the most “natural” dispositions, 
typically favoring close family members.34 Robert Sitkoff and Max 
Schanzenbach combed through trust holdings reports filed with 
financial regulators, estimating that roughly $100 billion in assets 
 
28 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND INHERITANCE LAW (2009). 
29 See, Ascher, supra note 25, at 1171. This conversation now seems quaint. See 
Deficit Tracker, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, Jan. 12, 2021, at 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deficit-tracker/. 
30 Ascher, supra note 25, at 71–72. 
31 GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, supra note 22, at 24–26. 
32 Id. at 34–35. 
33 Id. at 35–36. 
34 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235–
36 (1996). 
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had migrated virtually tax free into dynasty trusts.35 Crafty estate 
planners were settling these trusts in states that had eviscerated 
the rule against perpetuities, so that assets could avoid taxes if 
they were sequestered in trusts.36  
The work of Professor Sitkoff and Schanzenbach and others 
reified Ascher’s argument, exposing testamentary freedom as the 
modus of tax evasion.37 More fundamentally (and also more 
disturbingly), Professor Leslie revealed that testamentary intent 
was merely a myth we teach in law school; in practice, courts felt 
free to override the decedents’ wishes to favor surviving spouses 
and close blood relatives.  
By 2005, when Professors Sitkoff and Schanzenbach were 
working on the RAP, the estate tax exemption had swollen to $1.5 
million, and the top rate had come down to 47% (applying to a 
top bracket of $2 million).38 These drastic changes were the fruit 
of decades of organization by the Repealers. Throughout the 
1990s, Repealers brought people of color and moderate-income 
families into their fold by casting the estate tax as a chokehold on 
everyone’s upward mobility—despite the reality that it touched 
less than 2 percent of households.39 When George W. Bush took 
the White House in 2001, federal budget surpluses rendered 
taxation less urgent, and progressive lawmakers and organizers 
could not muster a cogent defense.40 The Repealers secured the 
most sizeable concessions yet for the estate tax; in 2010, concerned 
about the mid-term elections President Obama and Democratic 
lawmakers even extended and augmented those cuts.  
 
35 Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359 
(2005). 
36 Id. at 371–74. 
37 See also Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003); Dukeminier & 
Krier, supra note 7. 
38 Jacobson et al., supra note 21. 
39 GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, supra note 22, at 69, 119. Of all the Repealers’ 
branding, the most effective was to rename the estate tax the “death tax.” 
40 Id. at 99–103. 
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Hence, the diverging paths of T&E scholars and the repeal 
movement illuminate the chasm between the academy and public 
perceptions of the estate tax. Today, with the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act of 2017, the exclusion has metastasized to $11.58 million while 
the top tax rate has wilted to 40% (applying to a top bracket of $1 
million).41 Wealth inequality in the U.S. is at levels not seen since 
the Gilded Age, when monopolies in railroads and banking 
allowed robber barons to pillage their way to fortunes.42 In the 
span of four decades, we have reprised the level of wealth 




Figure 1: Estate Tax Exemptions and Top Since 1977 
 
The newest generation of T&E scholarship is obsessed with 
inequality. From dynasty trusts to intestacy, scholars are trying to 
dismantle the structures most responsible for the velocity of 
 
41 26 U.S.C. § 2010; 26 C.F.R. § 20.2010-1. 
42 Estelle Sommeiller & Mark Price, The New Gilded Age: Income Inequality in the 
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inequality. They have pointed out, for instance, that high-wealth 
families can avail themselves of favorable laws and complex to 
enjoy a rarified sovereignty.43 This foments systemic risk in the 
financial system, shifts tax burdens to lower-income families, and 
widens inequality.44 Other scholars have focused on intestacy, 
which is ill-suited to the needs of heirs and survivors in low-
income families.45 The regime often leads to fractional interests in 
housing stock, a “tragedy of the anticommons” that allows 
developers to pick up property cheaply, evict residents, and 
gentrify a neighborhood.46 
Methodologically, inequality-minded T&E scholars have also 
enlisted increasingly sophisticated empirical techniques to gather 
information and vet their hypotheses.47 The burgeoning empirical 
literature has covered probate lending,48 property taxes,49 the 
elective share,50 and the prevalence of estate planning.51 
This critical T&E literature sidesteps the artifice of 
testamentary freedom, as if the imperative to counter inequality 
displaces all other goals. Indeed, this mandate has been accepted 
by virtually every other field within law. Inequality has taken on 
heightened urgency with the string of populist political 
movements (both right-wing and left-wing) exploiting economic 
grievances, which only widens economic chasms once these 
 
43 See Tait, supra note 4. 
44 Id. 
45 See Mary Louise Fellows & E. Gary Spitko, How Should Non-Probate Transfers 
Matter in Intestacy?, 53 DAVIS L. REV. 2207 (2020); Weisbord, supra note 8. 
46 See Wright, supra note 12. 
47 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Symposium: Empirical Analysis of Wealth Transfer 
Law—Introduction, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2083 (2020). 
48 David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Probate Lending, 126 YALE L.J. 
102 (2016). 
49 Wright, supra note 12. 
50 Naomi Cahn, What’s Wrong About the Elective Share “Right”?, 53 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 2087 (2020); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Individuated Determination of a Surviving 
Spouse’s Elective Share, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2473 (2020). 
51 Emily S. Taylor Poppe, Surprised by the Inevitable: A National Survey of Estate 
Planning Utilization, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2511 (2020). 
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insurgents assume power.52 The phenomenon’s “pervasive and 
pernicious effects are therefore a feedback loop reinforcing the 
concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the 
very few at the expense of the great many.”53 By virtue of its 
corrosive power, inequality is one of the greatest threats of our 
time.  
Combatting inequality can certainly be a goal of T&E.  
Clearly, any invocation to history and precedent in defense of 
testamentary freedom is misplaced at best and inimical to tax 
fairness at worst. We can even stipulate to the pernicious effects 
inequality. However, a more basic question remains: What do we 
mean by “inequality”? More precisely, what kind of inequality 
should T&E address? 
 
B.  Defining Inequality 
 
Inequality has different meanings and dimensions. There is 
income disparity, which scholars and policymakers often mean by 
“inequality,”54 and then there is wealth disparity, which is harder 
to measure.55 There is inequality within a country, among 
countries, and worldwide.56 Even the proper gauge of inequality 
 
52 See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016); MARTIN SANDBU, 
ECONOMICS OF BELONGING: A RADICAL PLAN TO WIN BACK THE LEFT BEHIND 
AND ACHIEVE PROSPERITY FOR ALL (2020). 
53 Chang, supra note 16, at 90. 
54 See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of 
Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q. J. ECON. 1553 (2014) 
(measuring the increase in child incomes against parental incomes); Ellora 
Derenoncourt & Claire Montialoux, Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality, 136 
Q. J. ECON. 169 (2020) (gauging wage differentials between Black and White 
workers). 
55 Sandra E. Black & Paul J. Devereux, Recent Developments in Intergenerational 
Mobility, in HANDBOOK IN LABOR ECONOMICS (Orley Ashenfelter and David 
Card eds., 2011); Strand, supra note 3, at 458–60. 
56 BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND 
GLOBAL INEQUALITY 7–11 (2005).  
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is subject to dispute—for instance the Gini coefficient is the 
standard measure,57 but it is prone to criticism.58  
Today, inequality has blurred national boundaries. The 
ultrawealthy can travel and move assets effortlessly across 
borders.59 Outsourcing and globalization have hollowed out 
manufacturing-dependent middle classes in nearly every Western 
industrialized nation.60 Paradoxically, though, Curiously, 
worldwide inequality has diminished in recent years.61 This is 
primarily because a vibrant middle class has emerged in Asia—
more specifically, China—where manufacturing has flourished.62 
Inequality is slippery and persistent. When we counter it in 
one area, we may augment it elsewhere. The field of welfare 
economics is replete with exercises pondering such scenarios. For 
example, hypothetical is a society where the poorest member has 
wealth of 9 units, the next 1,000 poorest members have wealth of 
10 units, and the remaining 1,000 members have wealth of 100 
units. An allocation that absolutely prioritizes redistribution to 
 
57 See Human Development Reports, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
(2013), http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient 
[https://perma.cc/9JND-ECCS]. 
58 See José Gabriel Palma, Homogeneous Middles vs. Heterogeneous Tails, and the 
End of the ‘Inverted‐U’: It's All About the Share of the Rich, 42 DEVELOPMENT AND 
CHANGE 87 (2011). 
59 BROOKE HARRINGTON, CAPITAL WITHOUT BORDERS: WEALTH MANAGERS AND 
THE ONE PERCENT (2016). 
60 Branko Milanovic has depicted this graphically in his now-famous “elephant 
chart,” which suggests, among other things, that working class incomes in 
developed economies have stagnated—a feature some economists have 
ascribed to globalization. For a discussion, see Caroline Freund, Deconstructing 
Branko Milanovic's “Elephant Chart”: Does It Show What Everyone Thinks?, PIIE 
(2016), https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-
watch/deconstructing-branko-milanovics-elephant-chart-does-it-show. 
61 See id. 
62 This dynamic has reforged the relationships between China on one hand and 
the U.S. and Europe on the other. China draws ire for peeling away 
manufacturing jobs and pilfering trade secrets, but American and European 
sectors from biotech to education are heavily dependent on Chinese funds. 
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the poorest member may overlook the other members who are not 
far off.63  
More practically, some T&E reforms may exacerbate short-
term inequality in their attempts at redressing long-term 
inequality. As Section IV discusses, closing off estate tax loopholes 
may divert settlors toward inter vivos investments. Given that 
investments appreciate in value more quickly than wages rise,64 
the gaps between the investing class and labor will continue to 
widen. 
Of inequality’s myriad variations, this Essay argues that T&E 
must tackle the intergenerational stickiness of wealth disparities. 
The field should facilitate IEM by enabling children to eventually 
move into a different economic class than their parents. At its core, 
T&E governs the transmission of wealth, usually across 
generations.65 It is therefore an apt setting to equalize, as much as 
possible, the advantages and headwinds that each new generation 
is born into. 
The literature on IEM is most fully developed in economics. 
From its roots in the intergenerational transmission of earnings,66 
the literature has exploded into a variety of inventive empirical 
studies, such as the causal effects of parental education and 
earnings on children’s earnings,67 the correlation between income 
inequality and intergenerational earnings elasticity,68 and the 
 
63 See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 752–55 
(2003) (citing THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 125 (1979)). See also MARC 
FLEURBAEY & FRANÇOIS MANIQUET, A THEORY OF FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE 39–45 (2011). 
64 This is Thomas Piketty’s central thesis in Capital in the Twenty-First Century—
that capital grows more quickly than labor. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Goldhammer trans. 2014). 
65 Even inter vivos trusts, whose assets a settlor can enjoy during their lifetime, 
contemplate a day when the grants become irrevocable after the settlor passes. 
66 For a summary, see Gary Solon, Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market, 
in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, Vol. III, 1761 (Orley Ashenfelter and 
David Card eds., 1999). 
67 Black & Devereux, supra note 55. 
68 Corak, supra note 11. 
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inelasticity of incomes and wealth between forebears and 
descendants.69 
IEM is often measured as the stickiness of incomes from one 
generation to the next, a phenomenon with both lineal and lateral 
dimensions. At the lineal dimension, incomes prove sticky not 
only from one generation to the next, but also across multiple 
generations. In one novel study, researchers in Italy found that 
contemporary families tend to inhabit the same occupations as 
their ancestors in medieval Florence, some 600 years earlier!70 At 
the horizontal dimension, the degree of intergenerational 
earnings mobility varies geographically. Researchers have found 
that moving from a zip code with low socioeconomic indicators 
to a zip code with higher ones can have marked effect on a child’s 
lifetime earnings.71  
Even though scholars tend to use earnings as a benchmark for 
inequality,72 a focus on intergenerational income differences takes 
us slightly off track. This Essay has proposed evaluating 
inequality through the intergenerational transmission of wealth, as 
well as countering inequality by fostering IEM. However, wealth 
is difficult enough to measure even as a snapshot in time,73 much 
less across generations.74 Two pressing questions follow: what 
 
69 Guglielmo Barne & Sauro Mocetti, Intergenerational Mobility in the Very Long 
Rul: Florence 1427-2011, __ REV. ECON. STUD. __ (forthcoming 2020). As the 
authors note, “political, demographic and economic upheavals [that] occurred 
in the meanwhile were not enough to untie the Gordian knot of socioeconomic 
inheritance.” Id. at __. 
70 This study is subject to some criticisms: for example, it cannot really account 
for the dynamics of immigration (of newcomers who might succeed or fail) and 
emigration (of those who do not succeed). 
71 Chetty et al., supra note 54. 
72 See, e.g., id.; Derenoncourt & Montialoux, supra note 54. 
73 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY 
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 2 (2012) (“Income inequality data offer only a 
snapshot of an economy at a single moment in time . . . . wealth gives a better 
picture of differences in access to resources.”).  
74 Black & Devereux, supra note 55. But see Charles Kerwin K. & Erik Hurst 
Charles, The Correlation of Wealth across Generations, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1155 
(2003). 
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does IEM-focused T&E look like, and how will we know that it is 
working? The remainder of the Essay addresses the first question, 
raising the second for future exploration. 
 
III.  THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PROGRESSIVE T&E 
 
T&E stands as the last bastion against wealth disparities, 
where the ill-gotten gains of one generation can be clawed back to 
start the next generation off on a more equal footing. This Section 
outlines the principles of a progressive paradigm of T&E that 
prioritizes IEM. Three elements unify such an approach: T&E’s 
relationship with business law; our ideals of equality and 
opportunity, which inform how much inequality we can tolerate; 
and forcing mean regression in the wealth distribution bell curve 
over time. 
This is a significant undertaking. It requires no less than an 
overhaul of how we think about T&E. Relatedly, it also requires 
communicating T&E’s equalizing potential to the public, a task 
scholars are sometimes loath to take on. Yet more so than in 
decades, academic and public attitudes toward inequality are 
converging. Politically, Americans of diametric dispositions are 
also railing against a rigged economic system. This is an 
opportune time for progressive scholars to relay the importance 
of T&E, by capitalizing on the indignation of our era. 
A.  Interface with Business Laws 
 
To galvanize support for IEM, progressive T&E scholars must 
portray inheritance as the realm to reset the economic playing 
field with each new generation. Due to differences in education 
and opportunity, in any given generation, high-income earners 
might accumulate far more wealth than everyone else, but that 
separation need not carry over to their children—and certainly 
not in perpetuity. Inheritance law therefore stands as the 
counterpoint to business law: if the latter foments inequality, the 
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former shall level the economic scales by progressively reshaping 
wealth transfers. 
Despite our era of political, social, and racial polarization, this 
is a propitious time to reframe the conversation around wealth 
transfers. Both conservatives and progressives agree vehemently 
on one thing: the economic system is rigged.75 Laws governing 
the generation of wealth are not rules of fair play but, instead, 
cater to wealthy elites and fuel inequity. 
Examples abound. From the 2008 financial crisis to the 2020 
pandemic, low-income households have borne the brunt of 
recession but were the last to be lifted by the “rising tide” of 
recovery. Households of color suffered disproportionately in both 
downturns, but working-class Whites were stymied as well.  
Indeed, prompted by the embrace of right-wing populism in 
working-class ethnic majorities around the world,76 academics 
have been consumed with the travails of the White working class. 
This racialized socioeconomic group has been displaced by 
globalization, union busting, private equity corporate shuffles, 
and other seismic trends; yet they have also consolidated as a 
 
75 At the conservative end of the political spectrum, the example is the sizeable 
crossover of Sanders supporters to Trump voters in 2016. See John Sides, Did 
Enough Bernie Sanders Supporters Vote for Trump to Cost Clinton the Election?, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/08/24/did-enough-bernie-sanders-supporters-vote-for-
trump-to-cost-clinton-the-election/ (quoting Brian Schaffner, who pegged this 
number at 12%). This connection is far from settled, though. See Brian F. 
Schaffner, Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The 
Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism, 133 POL. SCI. Q. 9 (2018) (attributing Clinton’s 
electoral loss to racism and sexism). On the progressive end, the unexpected 
success of the Jacobin magazine stands as an example of the resurgence of 
socialist economics in our times. 
76 A brief list of examples includes the populist right’s rise in Austria, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Germany, the Netherlands, the Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Serbia, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. in the last two decades. 
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voting block around nativism.77 Nonetheless, this constituency 
shares with the political left the same economic grievances against 
ultrawealthy elites. 
Uneven business laws have allowed the already-wealthy to 
amass fortunes at the expense of almost everyone else. 
Shareholder primacy in corporate law elevates equity owners 
above all other constituents, including workers (hence, the 
dichotomy between capital and labor),78 creditors (who, 
famously, are owned no fiduciary duties),79 and the public (to 
whom costs are externalized).80 Corporate raiders through the 
decades have exploited shareholder primacy to take over ailing 
companies, cut costs mercilessly, saddle target entities with debt, 
and flip them for profit.81 In antitrust, lax policies have abetted big 
finance, big pharma, big ag, and especially big tech in their 
erosion of salaries, privacy, and competition.82 Sitting on 
fortresses of cash reserves, incumbents are able to invest lavishly 
 
77 See ANDREA L.P. PIRRO, THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE: IDEOLOGY, IMPACT, AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE (2015); 
MÜLLER, supra note 52; SANDBU, supra note 52. 
78 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 323–24 (1999); PIKETTY, supra note 64. However, Silicon 
Valley turns the primacy of capital over labor on its head. There, innovation is 
primarily the product of a highly educated and handsomely paid work force, 
which is now being criticized for holding venture capital (and its constraints 
on erratic founder behavior) on its head. See Charles Duhigg, How Venture 
Capitalists are Deforming Capitalism, NEW YORKER, Nov. 30, 2020. 
79 See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 
No. 121501991 WL 277613, *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). But see Adam S. Hofri-
Winogradow (manuscript on file with author). 
80 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733 (2005). 
81 Examples abound. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, Profits for Buyout Firms as Company 
Debt Soared, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009 (storied bedding company filing for 
bankruptcy protection because its investors incurred greater debts for larger 
short-term payouts). 
82 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG 
AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY (2020); DAVID DAYEN, MONOPOLIZED: LIFE IN THE 
AGE OF CORPORATE POWER (2020); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST 
IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018). 
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in tactics that undercut insurgents while conveying minimal 
benefits to consumers.83 What emerges, then, is a two-tiered 
business world where monopolies and oligopolies survive—even 
thrive—amidst downturns while almost everyone else fails. 
Through it all, the largest shareholders of these goliath 
firms—most prominently, Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Mark 
Zuckerberg, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffet—pocket ill-gotten 
gains that are not adequately recaptured by taxes.84 The tax rates 
for capital gains, such as dividends from stockholdings, are 
notoriously below those for ordinary income, which is how 
wageworkers are paid.85 Further, the trend today is for enterprises 
to move away from classifying their workers as employees, so that 
they can forego benefits.86 Savvy planning can even help the 
ultrawealthy avoid taxes altogether, by funneling their assets 
through shell companies and jurisdictions that serve as tax 
dodges.87 This has prompted economists to call for taxes on 
wealth holdings regardless of their situs, as well as for corporate 
taxes based on customers rather than domicile.88 In reality, taxes 
 
83 Ufuk Akcigit & William Kerr, Growth through Heterogeneous Innovations, 126 
J. POL. ECON. 1374 (2018). 
84 On the obscene increases in billionaire wealth during the pandemic, see Net 
Worth of U.S. Billionaires Has Soared by $1 Trillion—To Total of $4 Trillion—Since 
Pandemic Began, AMERICANS FOR TAX FAIRNESS, Dec. 9, 2020, 
https://americansfortaxfairness.org/wp-content/uploads/12-9-20-National-
Billionaires-Report-Press-Release-1T-4T-FINAL-1.pdf. 
85 See Topic No. 409: Capital Gains and Losses, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409 (last accessed Feb. 25, 2021). 
86 See Proposition 22: Exempts App-based Transportation and Delivery Companies 
from Providing Employee Benefits to Certain Drivers, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF 
STATE, https://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/22/ (last accessed Feb. 25, 
2021). 
87 RONEN PALAN, THE OFFSHORE WORLD: SOVEREIGN MARKETS, VIRTUAL PLACES, 
AND NOMAD MILLIONAIRES (2006); GABRIEL ZUCMAN THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF 
NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS (TERESA LAVENDER FAGAN TRANS., 
2015); BASTIAN OBERMAYER & FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE PANAMA PAPERS: 
BREAKING THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH AND POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY 
(2017). 
88 See PIKETTY, supra note 64. 
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seem to be paid by those who cannot afford blue chip financial 
and legal counsel (i.e., most taxpayers).89 
T&E itself plays a major role in accentuating inequality. A 
business owner who engages in a risky enterprise, such as 
medicine,90 real estate,91 or outright fraud,92 can set up a trust in a 
jurisdiction that does not recognize foreign judgments.93 This 
way, if a tort victim or defrauded contractor sues and prevails, the 
settlor would be judgment-proof. Better yet, the trust could 
designate the settlor as both the beneficiary and initial trustee, so 
that the offender can direct the trust and enjoy its assets during 
their lifetime.94 These asset protection trusts (“APTs”) generate 
fees for a coterie of lawyers and financial advisors, so jurisdictions 
have raced to validate them.  
Liberal inheritance laws premised on testamentary freedom 
then allow those gains to be transmitted gratis to future 
beneficiaries, forever out of the reach of creditors. In the example 
above, dynasty trusts can be settled in states that have abrogated 
 
89 Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden Trillions, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Oct. 
27, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/27/panama-the-
hidden-trillions/ [perma.cc/9APW-M6MB] (“[T]he rich and the powerful 
exited long ago from the messy business of paying tax . . . . They don’t pay tax 
anymore, and they haven’t paid tax for quite a long time.”) (quoting Luke 
Harding, The Guardian; internal quotations omitted). 
90 See Asset Protection for Doctors, ASSET PROTECTION PLANNERS (2019), 
https://www.assetprotectionplanners.com/strategies/doctors/; How To Set 
Up a Cook Islands Trust, THE OFFSHORE CORPORATION (2021), 
https://offshorecorporation.com/trust/how-to-cook-islands-trust/. 
91 See Michael Kranish, Donald Trump, Facing Financial Ruin, Sought Control of 
His Elderly Father’s Estate. The Family Fight was Epic, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 2020; 
Gabe Alpert, Companies Owned by President Donald Trump, Investopedia (2021), 
https://www.investopedia.com/updates/donald-trump-companies/. 
92 FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999). 
93 See Cook Islands International Trusts Act of 1984 (2004), available at 
https://trusts.it/admincp/UploadedPDF/200707241052350.lCookInternation
alTrustsAct1984.pdf (last accessed Feb. 25, 2021). See also Stewart E. Sterk, Asset 
Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048–
50 (2000). 
94 See Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d at 1243. 
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the RAP; consequently, the trusts never terminate, and they are 
not assessed gift and transfer taxes. In this way, the monopolist’s 
children and grandchildren are born into gilded cradles where, 
without ever lifting a finger, they can enjoy the fruits of their 
benefactors’ aggressive business tactics—a world far from the 
descendants of wageworkes. 
Yet T&E can also have tremendous redistributive potential. 
Certain rules and doctrines act as an input into the tax system 
(e.g., the RAP) or bring together rich debtors and poor creditors 
(e.g., APTs).95 These rules are distributively efficient, and they can 
be altered to prevent excessive sheltering of assets. Such reforms 
might not prevent the uneven generation of wealth (which would 
be the province of business laws), but they might slow the 
disparate accumulation of wealth over generations. 
In the past, law and economics scholars have disparaged legal 
rules as a redistributive mechanism because of efficiency, 
legitimacy, and administrability concerns.96 They counter that 
taxation is preferable.97 Today, there is a more nuanced 
understanding of the capacity of legal rules to combat 
inequality—as well as of the failings of the tax system.98 In fact, 
many governments have written equity considerations into the 
way their legal institutions interpret rules around contracts and 
torts.99 
 
95 See Chang, supra note 16. 
96 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 17. This has come to be known as the double 
distortion argument. 
97 Id. 
98 See Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in 
Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1126 
(2004); Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On The Limits of Redistributive 
Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1 
(2005); Chris Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1003, 1006–09 (2001). 
99 See Kevin Davis & Mariana Pargendler, Contract Law and Inequality, American 
Society of Comparative Law Annual Conference, Oct. 15, 2020, video available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1kgoW5cVfg&feature=youtu.be. 
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Inheritance might therefore be positioned as a safety net to 
arrest the velocity of inequality as it compounds. In this way, it 
serves as a counterpoint t o the loose business laws that allow 
enterprises to amass market power, erode privacy, maximize 
returns to a narrow class of insiders, and externalize the carnage 
to labor, the environment, and public systems. Our society’s 
skepticism toward how wealth is generated—under the rules of 
fair play in business law—can be harnessed for T&E reform. T&E 
can claw back the ill-gotten gains from poorly designed or 
enforced business laws before they are locked in for successive 
generations. 
 
B.  Equality and Opportunity 
 
Classical liberals and Marxists have long tussled over the 
inevitability of inequality. While liberals view the market as an 
efficient allocator of economic mobility, Marxists believe that the 
market simply reproduces class hierarchies.100 Still, both sides 
agree that intergenerational mobility should be high.101 For the 
political right, a child should be able to transcend their parent’s 
class through hard work; for the left, structural barriers to class 
transcendence should be dismantled. In converging around 
intergenerational mobility, both sides would accept some degree 
of inequality for the sake of individual advancement and societal 
prosperity. 
But precisely what type of inequality should we tolerate? 
Here T&E can help formulate ground rules for equity and 
advancement, by highlighting the distinctions between income 
and wealth. 
 
100 Thomas Piketty, Theories of Persistent Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility, 
in HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, Vol. 1, 430–31 (A.B. Atkinson & F. 
Bourguignon eds., 2000). 
101 Id. at 431. 
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Wealth is passed directly from testators and settlors to 
beneficiaries. For ultrawealthy households, the assets can be a 
pool of financial instruments,102 real property,103 or a business;104  
for the poor, there might be no assets—or merely a 
fractionated interest in a home.105 Wealth is easy to devise, hard 
to measure, and perhaps a truer measure of inequality than 
income.  
The intergenerational transmission of income, on the other 
hand, is less straightforward. Wealthy household can cultivate 
human capital, for instance by investing in education, to maintain 
high incomes for the next generation. In this way, incomes become 
“sticky” intergenerationally, exhibiting close correlation between 
parental earnings and a child’s earnings as an adult.106 And in 
turn, the lack of IEM, as measured by the correlation of incomes 
between fathers and sons, becomes a marker of inequality.107 
Normatively, the stickiness of incomes is easier to accept than 
the stickiness of wealth. To the extent that education and other 
forms of human capital determine lifetime earnings, investments 
in these determinants should be encouraged. Moreover, when 
 
102 See Jacobson et al., supra note 21. 
103 See Kranish, supra note 91. On the distinction between capital and land, 
especially as applied to Piketty’s formula, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, New Theoretical 
Perspectives on the Distribution of Income and Wealth Among Individuals, in 
INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: PATTERNS AND POLICY 2–3 (Kaushik Basu & Joseph 
E. Stiglitz eds., 2016). 
104 See Warren E. Buffett, Letter to Shareholders 11, Feb. 22, 2020, available at 
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2019ltr.pdf (“Today, my will 
specifically directs its executors – as well as the trustees who will succeed them 
in administering my estate after the will is closed – not to sell any Berkshire 
shares.”). 
105 See Thomas W. Mitchell, Reforming Property Law to Address Devastating Land 
Loss, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
106 Corak, supra note 11. 
107 A confounding factor, however, is the fact wealthy households often pass 
down their family businesses, which then aligns parental and child earnings. 
Id. 
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incomes track ability or diligence, a society that values 
meritocracy will endure some degree of earnings disparity.108  
Wealth disparity, on the other hand, is not so easily 
redeemed. A sizeable bequest by a settlor or testator can set up 
beneficiaries for life; it allows them to take risks and start 
businesses,109 give to charities and imprint themselves on the civic 
life of a city,110 or simply live in the lap of luxury.111 By contrast, 
being born into the wrong family not only fails to convey that 
head-start or leg-up, but it may well hold a child back for life.112  
One way to view wealth disparity, then, is as a constraint on 
opportunity.113 The determinants of income should be, to some 
degree, one’s merit; yet this maxim is eviscerated if one’s income 
is tied instead to the size of another person’s devise.114 For our 
purposes, as we try to reorient the goals of T&E, we must answer 
this question: is the field to curtail the intergenerational stickiness 
 
108 Piketty, supra note 100. 
109 Kranish, supra note 91. 
110 See Melissa Harris and Julie Wernau, The Pritzker Family Tree, Chicago 
Tribune, Dec. 18, 2011, https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-xpm-
2011-12-18-ct-biz-1218-pritzkers-family-graphic-20111218-story.html; 
Remembering Brooke Astor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007, 
https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/brooke-astor-is-dead-at-
105/?searchResultPosition=5. 
111 Zachary R. Mider, How Wal-Mart’s Waltons Maintain Their Billionaire Fortune: 
Taxes, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 12, 2013, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-12/how-wal-mart-s-
waltons-maintain-their-billionaire-fortune-taxes; Megan Willett-Wei & Mike 
Nudelman, Meet the Waltons: A Guide To America's Wealthiest Family, BUSINESS 
INSIDER, Oct. 9, 2013, https://www.businessinsider.com/meet-the-waltons-
wal-mart-family-tree-2013-10?op=1 
112 Chetty et al., supra note 54.  
113 For a revamp of how we view equality and opportunity, see JOSEPH FISHKIN, 
BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014). 
114 Of course, even the notion of merit belies the fact that economic success is 
mostly dictated by factors wholly outside anyone’s control—including luck 
(the accident of the family one is born into) and economic structures (the 
winner-take-all free market). See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE TYRANNY OF MERIT: 
WHAT’S BECOME OF THE COMMON GOOD? (2020). 
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of wealth or income? On this point, this Essay argues that wealth 




C.  Mean Regression 
 
To curtail the stickiness of wealth inequality, T&E should 
limit the effortless transmission of wealth in hyperrich 
households while facilitating it in low-income households. 
Visually, this is denoted by the extreme ends of a wealth 
distribution bell curve converging toward the middle. The 
extremities are where IEM can be most can be fostered most 
efficiently. Ultrawealthy households can be deterred from 
amassing more wealth, while low-income households can be 
propelled forward and upward. 
Two macroeconomic perspectives on households are 
important: IEM and the splintering of family compositions along 
economic lines. Compared to other industrialized countries, the 
U.S. exhibits a high degree of inequality and a low degree of IEM, 
so that the elasticity between paternal earnings and a son’s adult 
earnings is extremely low.115 While we know that 
intergenerational earnings elasticity can be cultivated through 
public institutions such as our education system, we are also 
aware of the headwinds to class mobility. In recent decades, 
public investment in education has dwindled, and households 
have responded by augmenting their private investment in 
human capital outside schooling, particularly in the elementary 
years.116 Rather than addressing structural inequities, political 
leaders are resorting to quick-fixes such as loosening access to 
credit.117 
 
115 Corak, supra note 11. 
116 Id. 
117 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL 
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 8–9 (2010). 
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Meanwhile, the past quarter century has witnessed declines 
in both marriage rates and divorce rates in the U.S.118 For higher-
income households, these trends correlate with technological 
improvements, which have made home care easier, and delayed 
childbirth and higher educational attainment among women, 
which has begun to close the gendered wage cap (somewhat).119 
Gone are the days of “production complementarities” that Gary 
Becker posited of marriage, as a union between husbands and 
wives specializing in different market and domestic spheres.120 
Instead, marriage now binds couples who are on similar economic 
footing and share similar interests. Among lower-income 
households, however, marriage is becoming infrequent, replaced 
by cohabitation.121 This bimodal distribution reveals that 
marriage is becoming restricted to couples who are more similar 
than different; hence, ensuing marriages are more stable. 
Amid the pandemic, this bimodal distribution is becoming 
even clearer. While wealthy households work in sectors that can 
switch effortlessly to remote, low-income households must 
contend with the pandemic face-to-face. 
Finally, for ultrarich households comprised of, say, the top 
0.01% of earners, curtailing dynasty trusts could prompt would-
be settlors to invest rather than sequester their assets in trusts. The 
lesson from the financial crisis is that when these elites seek 
investment opportunities in a stagnant economy, asset and real 
estate bubbles are created, and the financial sector conjures ever 
more sophisticated products to funnel “rich’s surplus funds” into 
 
118 Betsy Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their 
Driving Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2007). See also Shelly Lundberg at al., 
Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing, 
30 J. ECON. PERSP. 79 (2016). 
119 Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 118. 
120 See GARY BECKER, TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981). 
121 See Naomi Cahn, Dismantling the Trusts and Estates Canon, 2019 WIS. L. 
REV. 165 (2019; T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. 
L. REV. 55, 91 (2004); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing 
Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2000). 
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loans for less affluent households.122 In advocating for restraints 
on tax dodges for the ultrawealthy, then, we must bear in mind 
whether we are trading in one type of inequality for another. 
 
 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING IEM 
 
T&E scholars have embraced embrace a critical research 
agenda that pushes back against inequality. Among other things, 
they have proposed that the field’s legal rules be reconceptualized 
as redistribution mechanisms,123 that wealth transfer taxes be 
bolstered,124 that default rules avoid the worst pitfalls of 
intestacy,125 and that dynasty and asset protection trusts be 
curtailed.126 This Section illustrates what prioritizing IEM might 
look like in T&E. It begins with the most distributively 
consequential reforms: dismantling dynasty trusts, closing estate 
tax loopholes, and taxing estates heavily—all tactics targeting 
ultrawealthy families. Then this Section briefly discusses 
intestacy, which primarily affects lower-income households. 
A.  Dynasty Trusts 
 
Dynasty trusts owe their existence to perpetuities reform and, 
by a twist of tax history, the 1986 amendments to the GST tax, 
enacted to close the loophole of estate tax avoidance through 
devises to grandchildren (rather than children).127 The statute 
 
122 Jon D. Wisman, Wage stagnation, Rising Inequality and the Financial Crisis of 
2008, 37 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 921, 925 (2013). 
123 See Chang, supra note 16. 
124 See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate 
Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013). 
125 See Weisbord, supra note 8. 
126 See Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem 
of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523 (2006); Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The 
Stripping of the Trust: From Evolutionary Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 529 (2014); Kades, supra note 4. 
127 Kades, supra note 4, at 177–78. 
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allowed trusts to be exempt from the GST taxes but failed to 
impose a time limit on the duration of such trusts, leaving their 
duration to the vagaries of state RAPs.128 Over the ensuing 
decades, state legislatures eviscerated the RAP by adopting the 
wait-and-see approach,129 lengthening the perpetuities period up 
to 1,000 years,130 and repealing the rule altogether.131 
Concomitantly, the exclusion amount for gift, estate, and GST 
taxes grew from $1 million in 2000 to $11.58 million in 2019—
amounts that could be augmented roughly six-fold through life 
insurance and other estate planning strategies.132 Today, grantors 
with truly dynastic aspirations can settle trusts in any number of 
states and forever dodge estate taxes. 
Dynasty trusts are especially pernicious in times like ours, 
when interest rates hover close to 0%, economic stimulus is 
political intractable, and regulators have exhausted traditional 
options. The hoarding of assets in trust reinforces a paradox of 
thrift within the very circles where spending is viable.133 Writing 
in 2005, Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach reported that states 
abolishing the RAP saw their total trust assets increase by $6 
billion (up from an average of $19 billion) and average trust size 
increase by $200,000 (up from an average of $1 million, right at the 
 
128 Id. See also 26 U.S.C. § 2631. 
129 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (LexisNexis 2016); 20 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (West Supp. 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.27, § 501 
(LexisNexis 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.3 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
130 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §14-2901 (2009); CAL. PROB. CODE §§21200 et 
seq. (West Supp. 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §§15-11-1101 et seq. (West Supp. 2016); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§45a-490-496 (West Supp. 2016). See also Jessie 
Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in 
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1987); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 157, 157–59 (1988). 
131 See, e.g., 37 IDAHO CODE §55-111 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (2017). 
132 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 7, at 1318-19. 
133 See Kades, supra note 4. 
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exclusion amount).134 All in all, approximately $100 billion had 
been diverted to perpetual trusts, with virtually no benefit to the 
states abolishing or otherwise curtailing the RAP.135 
As the standard bearers of estate planning for the ultrarich, 
dynasty trusts have been targeted by tax and T&E scholars and 
policymakers for demolition. Some would close the GST loophole 
by cutting off the transfer tax exemption at either 90 years after 
settlement or at the generation of a settlor’s grandchildren.136 
Others have suggested federal legislation either against perpetual 
trusts or enabling living beneficiaries to vote for trust 
termination.137 Tax is often central to these proposals: perpetual 
trusts would look very different if they were taxed mercilessly.138 
More directly, as a cudgel against wealth inequality, scholars have 
proposed a wealth tax to supplant income, GST, and estate 
taxes.139 Wealth taxes would squarely confront the disparity in 
pace of growth between the capital (e.g., real estate or corporate 
holdings held by ultrarich households in trusts) and labor (i.e., 
how most households make money), though their 
constitutionality is contested.140 
One of the most innovative suggestions has come from Eric 
Kades. Professor Kades proposes taxing dynastic trusts to pull the 
 
134 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 12. 
135 Id. at 359. 
136 Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Options To Improve Tax 
Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures 392-95 (Comm. Print 2005).  
137 Joel C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities: Federal and State 
Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2537 (2006). 
138 See id. 
139 See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, How Would a Progressive Wealth 
Tax Work? Evidence from the Economics Literature (2019), at 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-zucman-wealthtaxobjections.pdf.  
Wealth taxes proposed by Saenz and Zucman?, benefits include harder to 
dodge (Piketty himself proposes this as a more direct solution to wealth 
inequality); constitutionality fiercely deliberated over;  
140 See Daniel Hemel and Rebecca Kysar, The Big Problem With Wealth Taxes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/opinion/wealth-tax-
constitution.html?searchResultPosition=1. 
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national savings rate up to the “golden rule” rate of 15%, where 
consumption is maximized.141 This rate equals the “sum of the 
depreciation rate for capital (roughly, the annual rate at which 
capital wears out) and the rate of growth of the population.”142 
Additionally, to combat the shorter-term paradox of thrift, 
Professor Kades has suggested taxing dynasty trusts as an 
“automatic stabilizer” during of economic downturns.143 These 
taxes would counteract excessive savings among wealthy 
households, prompting settlors to redirect some of their assets 
from trusts toward spending and investment. 
Yet perpetuities amendment faces legal and macroeconomic 
challenges. Because dynasty trusts are creatures of a race to the 
bottom with states competing for trust assets, federal intervention 
is required. Thus, the most viable schemes would harness federal 
taxation powers or some form of coordinated national 
response.144 Nonetheless, competition for trust assets does not 
only occur within the U.S.—it happens internationally as well. 
Wealth flows to the jurisdictions that regulate it most lightly, and 
grantors have already settled trillions of dollars in asset protection 
trusts (“APTs”) offshore, to keep them out of the reach of 
creditors.145 Dismantling dynasty trusts here might push settlors 
 
141 See Kades, supra note 4, at 207–08. See also Edmund Phelps, The Golden Rule 
of Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 638 (1961). 
142 Kades, supra note 4, at 198. 
143 Id. at 208–10. 
144 See Robert H. Freilich, Eliminating Perpetual Trusts Is a Critical Step Towards 
Alleviating America’s Devastating Income Inequality, 88 UMKC L. REV. 65 (2019). 
145 An APT is a self-settled (i.e., the settlor is the beneficiary) trust with the 
“disabling restraint” of a spendthrift provision that prevents the sale, 
assignment, and alienation of the beneficiary’s interest. For examples, see, e.g., 
FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999). See also 
Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048–50 (2000); Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden 
Trillions, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Oct. 27, 2016), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/27/panama-the-hidden-
trillions/ [perma.cc/9APW-M6MB] (“The economic system is, basically, that 
the rich and the powerful exited long ago from the messy business of paying 
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to re-route funds into countries that already operate as situses for 
their APTs. 
A more worrisome consequence of curbing dynasty trusts, 
however, is that it will catalyze certain forms of inter vivos 
expenditures over others. Stronger GST taxes on dynasty trusts, 
just like robust estate taxes, drives settlors toward lifetime 
consumption.146 Increased spending by settlors and lifetime 
beneficiaries certainly bolsters demand for goods and services, 
similar to the multiplier effect that Keynesian fiscal policy seeks 
to achieve.147 However, even the most determined beneficiary can 
find it difficult to fully spend down exorbitant sums of money.148 
If unused funds are directed toward investment, it may hasten 
inequality in unexpected ways, particularly during recessions. 
Some economists have traced the financial crisis back to 
ultrawealthy families and their hunt to invest unconsumed 
assets.149 Prior to the crisis, opportunities were rare because 
companies were funneling retained earnings not into investment 
or wages but, rather, into dividends (which operated as a 
feedback loop for income inequality). As a result, financiers 
packaged the wealth of rich households into loans to lower-
income households—loans that were securitized and then sold on 
secondary markets.150 In addition to augmenting the credit 
circulating the financial markets, this created housing and stock 
 
tax . . . . They don’t pay tax anymore, and they haven’t paid tax for quite a long 
time.”) (quoting Luke Harding, The Guardian; internal quotations omitted). 
146 Michael J. Boskin, An Economists’ Perspective on Estate Taxation, in Death, 
Taxes and Family Property: Essays and American Assembly Report 62 
(Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); Daniel J. Amato, The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly: The Political Economy and Unintended Consequences of Perpetual Trusts, 
Note, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 637 (2013). 
147 See Kades, supra note 4, at 195–27. See also N. GREGORY MANKIW, 
MACROECONOMICS 305–17 (8th ed. 2013). 
148 For actual and fictional examples, see Geraldine Fabrikant, Brooke Astor Has 
a Year's Worth of Giving Left, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996; BREWSTER’S MILLIONS 
(1985). 
149 See, e.g., Wisman, supra note 122. 
150 Id. at 924–26. 
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bubbles. In boom times, to quote Picketty’s paradigm, the value 
of capital pulls away from the value of labor; in downturns, 
capital is funneled into devalued assets, sowing the seeds for 
inequality. This dynamic mirrors theoretical studies of firm 
behavior in low-interest environments, which have found that 
incumbents with market power tend to invest while smaller 
players do not.151 Eventually, the smaller exit the market, 
enhancing its concentration. All in all, recessions lay the 
groundwork for future inequality; prying assets from the coffers 
of dynasty trusts for spending may contribute to widening 
income and wealth gaps. Put differently, this strategy amount to 
trading one type of inequality for another. 
How, then, should we assess the different types of inequality? 
This Essay argues that T&E reforms should prioritize IEM. 
Because the instruments and doctrines of T&E operate at inter-
generational interfaces, it they can affect disparities in the 
transmission of wealth across generations. For ultrawealthy 
households, reductions in assets held by dynasty trusts can 
precipitate the downward slide of a future generations of a 
settlor’s heirs. Even if inequality is fomented intragenerationally 
through heightened investment, it may be necessary in the 
advancement toward more parity in intergenerational mobility 
between rich and lower-income households. 
 
B.  Intestacy 
 
For lower-income households, intestacy stands as the greatest 
threat within T&E to the intergenerational transmission of wealth. 
Accordingly, scholars have recommended a number of 
improvements to intestacy. For example, appending a will as a 
testamentary schedule to tax filings would reduce the instances of 
 
151 Ernest Liu et al., Low Interest Rates, Market Power, and Productivity Growth 
(2019), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w25505. 
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intestacy.152 Utilizing a decedent’s nonprobate transfers (e.g., 
insurance or retirement plan beneficiary designations) to guide 
intestacy distributions would help conform to a decedent’s likely 
wishes—especially if it resulted in distributions to non-family 
members, who are disfavored under intestacy defaults.153 
Similarly, permitting transfer-on-death designations for homes, 
often the most valuable asset in most estates, would enable homes 
to pass outside the probate system and directly to heirs, reducing 
the likelihood of intestate successors receiving fractionated 
interests.154  
As with dynasty trusts, taxes are also central to the analysis 
of intestacy. Delinquency in paying property taxes, often in 
combination with the inability to physically maintain real 
property, can result in tax sales and foreclosures when heirs hold 
partial interests in a home. Staying tax sales and foreclosures for 
a period after a decedent’s death would allow heirs to pay off 
those debts and retain the home—or to restore and sell it.155  
These proposals share two themes: honoring, rather than 
vitiating, testamentary freedom; and maximizing the assets 
passed from decedents to their heirs.156 In some instances, 
decedents will not spend their windfall. Inheritance windfalls 
may even defy the policy goals of other types of windfalls, such 
as when governments give tax breaks or stimulus checks to lower-
income households to lubricate spending. Yet if heirs choose to 
hold onto their devises—for example, by living in, rather than 
selling, a home—those devises would provide a tailwind for 
 
152 See Weisbord, supra note 8.  
153 See Fellows & Spitko, supra note 45. 
154 See Wright, supra note 12, at 2637–38. 
155 Id. 
156 They also highlight disparities between the probate system, which touches 
succession in most households, and the relative ease of nonprobate transfers 
such as trusts. To be sure, probate is intractable for many heirs, but a fuller 
exploration of the bimodal distribution between probate and nonprobate is 
beyond this paper. 
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economic mobility. And if assets can be transmitted to the next 





V.  Conclusion 
 
This Essay has examined potential reforms to T&E from the 
standpoint of reducing inequality. Where results conflict with 
short-term economic stimulus, or seem indeterminate in 
confronting inequality, this Essay would prioritize the result that 
best cultivates intergenerational economic mobility. While this 
Essay analyzed dynasty trusts and intestacy as surrogates for 
ultrawealthy and lower-income households, wealth distribution 
is not entirely bimodal, and many instruments within T&E cater 
to the needs of the significant proportion of middle and upper-
middle income households (e.g., inter vivos trusts). Dynasty 
trusts and intestacy may be the most distributively consequential 
areas of T&E, but the myriad other instruments of T&E merit 
research as well on how they affect inequality and 
intergenerational mobility. With IEM as the field’s first principle 
and mean regression as its economic guidepost, T&E will be better 
positioned to counter inequality. 
